Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre struggled for the whole of their philosophical careers against one of modern Western philosophy's most pervasive concepts, the Cartesian notion of self. A notion of self is always a complex of ideas; in the case of Beauvoir and Sartre it includes the ideas of embodiment, temporality, the Other, and intersubjectivity. This essay will show the considerable part that gender, especially Beauvoir's position as a woman in twentieth-century France, played in the development, presentation and reception (...) of the couple's alternative formulation. (shrink)

If science fiction is a genre, then attempts to think about the nature of science fiction will be affected by one’s understanding of what genres are. I shall examine two approaches to genre, one dominant but inadequate, the other better, but only occasionally making itself seen. I shall then discuss several important, interrelated issues, focusing particularly on science fiction : what it is for a work to belong to a genre, the semantics of genre names, the validity of attempts to (...) define genres, and the connections between genre and normativity. One important but neglected clue to the nature of genres lies in the kinds of disagreements they generate over the assignment of works to genres. I conclude by explaining why these disagreements tell us something about the nature of genres, and discussing in some detail two famous cases of disagreement about whether some work or works are science fiction. (shrink)

A teoria dos dois sistemas (Kahneman, 2011), em suas várias vertentes, assume que a tomada de decisão humana é baseada em dois sistemas cognitivos: um que é automático, rápido, agindo com mínimo esforço cognitivo, intuitivo (no sentido de Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010), e majoritariamente inconsciente; e outro que é reflexivo, lento, atuando com intenso esforço cognitivo, racional e totalmente consciente. Neste trabalho, investigamos a teoria dos dois sistemas e sua aplicação na tomada de decisão econômica em governos democráticos, com ênfase (...) especial na proposta de Kahneman. Consideramos sua abordagem incompleta e limitada na explicação do processo intuitivo que orienta a tomada de decisão. Essa limitação nos leva a defender a existência de um terceiro sistema de tomada de decisão em Economia: a intuição ecológica criativa, baseada no attunement entre affective drives e percepção direta de affordances, abordando não só as disposições e objetivos dos agentes, mas também a responsabilidade socioambiental das empresas e governos. Argumentamos que o terceiro sistema de tomada de decisão que propomos implica um conceito de intuição diferente do associativismo de ideias de Simon (1992), e damos como exemplo do funcionamento do terceiro sistema o processo de tomada de decisão que conduziu à formação do Banco Finapop, no Brasil. (shrink)

HISTÓRIA DA SOCIOLOGIA: O DESENVOLVIMENTO DA SOCIOLOGIA I -/- A SOCIOLOGIA BRASILEIRA -/- HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY I -/- THE BRAZILIAN SOCIOLOGY -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE. E-mails: [email protected] e [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)9.8143-8399. -/- PREMISSA -/- Como na França de Émile Durkheim, os primeiros passos da Sociologia no Brasil, em termos institucionais, ocorreram a partir de iniciativas para a inclusão dessa disciplina no ensino secundário (hoje, ensino médio). A primeira tentativa ocorreu (...) em 1890, logo após a proclamação da República, com a reforma educacional de Benjamin Constant, que defendia o ensino laico em todos os níveis. O ensino secundário tinha por objetivo a formação intelectual dos jovens fora do contexto religioso, então predominante. Mas, sem nunca ter sido de fato incluída nos currículos escolares, a Sociologia foi expurgada pela Reforma Epitácio Pessoa, em 1901. Somente em 1925 a Sociologia retornou ao currículo do ensino secundário por meio da Reforma de Rocha Vaz, que tinha os mesmos objetivos da de Benjamin Constant. Em decorrência dessa reforma, o Colégio Pedro II, na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, implantou a Sociologia regularmente no seu currículo. Em 1928, a disciplina foi introduzida nas escolas de vários estados brasileiros, notadamente em São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro e Pernambuco. -/- Desde 1925, podem-se destacar alguns intelectuais que contribuíram para o ensino de Sociologia no ensino secundário, lecionando e escrevendo manuais para esse nível: Fernando de Azevedo (1894-1974), Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987), Carneiro Leão (1887-1966) e Delgado de Carvalho (1884-1980), em São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro e Recife. Eles tinham por objetivo preparar intelectualmente os jovens das elites dirigentes, elevando o conhecimento daqueles que chegavam às escolas médias. Esses autores, em sua maioria, foram influenciados pela Sociologia desenvolvida na Europa e nos Estados Unidos. -/- Em 1931, a reforma de Francisco Campos, no governo de Getúlio Vargas, introduziu a Sociologia nos cursos preparatórios ao ensino superior nas faculdades de Direito, Ciências Médicas, Engenharia e Arquitetura, além de mantê-la nos cursos normais (de formação de professores). -/- No final do Estado Novo, em 1942, o governo de Getúlio Vargas, através de seu ministro da Educação, Gustavo Capanema, implantou a Reforma Capanema, que excluiu a Sociologia do ensino secundário brasileiro. Assim, a Sociologia fez parte do currículo do ensino secundário por 18 anos (1925-1942). Ela, contudo, permaneceu como matéria obrigatória do currículo das Escolas Normais, de nível secundário, destinadas à formação de professores do antigo ensino primário (o que corresponderia aos atuais 2º a 5º anos). -/- 1. A SOCIOLOGIA NO ENSINO SUPERIOR: INÍCIO DO SÉCULO XX -/- Nas primeiras décadas do século XX, a Sociologia no ensino superior estava presente de forma embrionária em vários estados brasileiros (Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo) e principalmente nos cursos de Direito. Desenvolveu-se de forma mais consistente, contudo, nos estados que passavam por um processo de industrialização e urbanização crescente desde o final da década de 1910. -/- Essas transformações da estrutura econômica e social repercutiram nas esferas culturais e educacionais, propiciando um crescente interesse pelos estudos científicos da realidade social da época. -/- Em decorrência disso, foram publicados importantes trabalhos que contribuíram para o desenvolvimento das ciências sociais no Brasil. Uma das preocupações dos pensadores daquele período era a busca do entendimento do Brasil por meio de seus componentes históricos, tendo por base as muitas vertentes europeias e estadunidenses das ciências humanas. -/- Esses pensadores defendiam a ideia de que havia uma ligação entre o passado colonial e a configuração social em que viviam. Para eles, esse condicionamento do passado deveria ser superado para que o país saísse do atraso. As preocupações desses pensadores giravam em torno do futuro do Brasil e das possibilidades de mudança social e das resistências a elas. Entre outros, podem ser citados: Francisco José de Oliveira Vianna (1883 -1951), Caio da Silva Prado Júnior (1907-1990), Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1902-1982), Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987) e Fernando de Azevedo (1894-1974). -/- Pode-se afirmar que foi entre as décadas de 1920 e 1940 que a Sociologia fincou alicerces no Brasil. Nesse período, procuraram-se definir mais claramente as fronteiras entre a Sociologia e as áreas do conhecimento afins, como a Literatura, a História e a Geografia, e institucionalizou-se o curso de Sociologia e/ou Ciências Sociais em faculdades e universidades. Foram fundadas a Escola Livre de Sociologia e Política (ELSP) em São Paulo, em 1933, e as Universidades de São Paulo (USP) e do Distrito Federal (UDF), esta no Rio de Janeiro, respectivamente em 1934 e 1935, nas quais foram instituídos cursos de Ciências Sociais. -/- Vários professores estrangeiros vieram ao Brasil para trabalhar nessas universidades e contribuíram de modo significativo para o desenvolvimento da Sociologia no Brasil. Entre outros, podem ser citados: Donald Pierson (1900-1995), Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955), Claude Lévi -Strauss (1908-2009), Georges Gurvitch (1894-1965), Roger Bastide (1898-1974), Charles Morazé (1913-2003) e Paul-Arbousse Bastide (1901-1985). -/- A revista Sociologia, da Escola Livre de Sociologia e Política, foi um exemplo da produção sociológica da época. Criada em 1939 e publicada até 1981, em São Paulo, constituiu um verdadeiro marco de estudo, pesquisa e divulgação das Ciências Sociais no Brasil. -/- 1.1 De 1940 a 1960: disseminação da Sociologia na universidade -/- A partir do final da Segunda Guerra Mundial até meados da década de 1960, disseminaram-se as Faculdades de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras no Brasil, em universidades ou fora delas, e a Sociologia passou a fazer parte do currículo dos cursos de Ciências Sociais ou a apresentar-se como disciplina obrigatória em outros cursos. -/- Uma nova geração de cientistas sociais passou a ter presença marcante no Brasil. Entre eles, podem ser citados: Florestan Fernandes (1920-1995), Antonio Candido (1918-2017), Maria Isaura Pereira de Queiroz (1918-2018), Juarez Rubens Brandão Lopes (1925-2011), Alberto Guerreiro Ramos (1915-1982), Luiz Aguiar da Costa Pinto (1920-2002) e Hélio Jaguaribe (1923-2018), que influenciaram muitos cientistas sociais em todo o território nacional. -/- Os principais temas de pesquisas, análises e discussões nesse período foram: imigração e colonização, estudos de comunidades, educação, folclore, questão rural e urbana, teoria e método das Ciências Sociais, estratificação e mobilidade sociais e sociologia da arte e da literatura. Cabe um destaque para o tema das relações étnico-raciais envolvendo a questão do negro no Brasil, graças a um projeto de pesquisa financiado pela Unesco. -/- Nesse período, a Sociologia tornou-se disciplina hegemônica no quadro das Ciências Sociais no Brasil, e a primeira a formar uma “escola” ou uma “tradição” em São Paulo, tendo em Florestan Fernandes um dos seus mentores. -/- 1.2 De 1960 a 1980: consolidação da Sociologia no Brasil -/- Mesmo sob a ditadura civil-militar no Brasil, a partir de 1964, a Sociologia começou a se expandir, principalmente nos grandes centros urbanos, e a se relacionar com outros campos das ciências humanas. As discussões sobre o processo de industrialização crescente no país foram o centro das atenções. -/- Um dos temas de discussão era o desenvolvimento, incluindo as teorias da dependência e da modernização. Outros temas de debates e pesquisas da época foram o trabalho industrial e o sindicalismo, a formação da classe trabalhadora, a urbanização crescente e as transformações no campo, os problemas da marginalidade social, a presença do capital estrangeiro e a indústria nacional. A questão educacional também esteve presente, pois de alguma forma os problemas sociais estavam vinculados à precariedade do setor. Foram bastante debatidos, ainda, o autoritarismo, principalmente depois do golpe militar de 1964, e o planejamento, criando-se uma interface com a ciência política. Além disso, destacaram-se, nesse momento, os estudos sobre a América Latina. -/- Em razão desses debates, foram incluídas nas universidades disciplinas como: Sociologia do Desenvolvimento, Sociologia Urbana, Sociologia Rural, Sociologia Industrial e do Trabalho (incluindo a questão sindical), Sociologia do Planejamento, Sociologia da Educação e da Juventude e Sociologia da Arte e Literatura. -/- Muitos foram os estudiosos que, em diferentes áreas do pensamento sociológico, desenvolveram pesquisas nessas décadas. Alguns dos que formaram a segunda geração de sociólogos no Brasil são: Octavio Ianni (1926-2004), Marialice M. Foracchi (1929-1971), Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1931-), Leôncio Martins Rodrigues (1934-), Heleieth Saffioti (1934-2010), Maurício Tragtenberg (1929-1998), Francisco de Oliveira (1933-), Luiz Pereira (1933-1985), Luiz Eduardo W. Wanderley (1935-), José de Souza Martins (1938-), Gabriel Cohn (1938-), Roberto Schwarz (1938-), Elide Rugai Bastos, Luiz Werneck Vianna (1938-) e Simon Schwartzman (1939-). -/- 1.3 Diversificação da Sociologia no Brasil -/- A partir da década de 1980, ampliam-se os cursos de graduação e pós-graduação (mestrado e doutorado) em Ciências Sociais e, em particular, de Sociologia em todo o território nacional, elevando o nível, em número e em qualidade, das pesquisas e do ensino da área. Os estudos sociológicos passaram a ser mais específicos, ocorrendo uma fragmentação dos temas/objetos, como: violência, gênero e sexualidade, corpo e saúde, religião, cotidiano, comunicação e informação, indústria cultural, representações sociais, consumo, cidadania, direitos humanos, questão ambiental, globalização, ciência e tecnologia, urbanização, juventude, família, trabalho, classes e mobilidade social, questões étnico-raciais, Estado e sociedade civil. -/- Novas gerações de sociólogos se formam nas universidades em quase todos os estados da federação, e há centros de ensino e pesquisa na maioria das universidades, disseminando-se assim a formação de sociólogos, sob diversas influências teóricas. A formação em Sociologia, que havia se estabelecido a partir de São Paulo e Rio de Janeiro, na década de 1930, expandiu-se para todo o território nacional em pouco mais de 50 anos. -/- 1.4 O retorno da Sociologia ao ensino médio -/- Oficialmente extinta do currículo do ensino médio em 1942, a Sociologia voltou a marcar presença em um ou outro estado da federação, de modo intermitente, a partir da década de 1980, com os primeiros ensaios de democratização da sociedade brasileira, conforme diz o sociólogo brasileiro Amaury C. Moraes, na esteira de mudanças na legislação educacional realizadas pelo governo ditatorial pós-1964. A Lei n° 7.044/82 flexibilizou o ensino médio (então 2º grau) e profissionalizante, abrindo espaço para a presença da Sociologia, não em caráter obrigatório, mas por escolha das escolas. Nesse sentido, ela começou a ter uma presença crescente nos currículos escolares. -/- Aqui cabe citar as Orientações Curriculares para o ensino médio, (p. 104-105). -/- Há uma interpretação corrente que (...) deve ser bem avaliada criticamente; ela afirma que a presença ou a ausência da Sociologia no currículo está vinculada a contextos democráticos ou autoritários, respectivamente. No entanto, se se observar bem, pelo menos em dois períodos isso não se confirma, ou se teria de rever o caráter do ensino de Sociologia para entender sua presença ou ausência. Entre 1931 e 1942, especialmente após 1937, a Sociologia está presente e é obrigatória no currículo em um período que abrange um governo que começa com esperanças democratizantes e logo se tinge de autoritarismo, assumindo sua vocação ditatorial mais adiante. Em outro momento, em plena democracia, o sentido do veto do Presidente da República (2001) à inclusão da Sociologia como disciplina obrigatória traz uma certa dificuldade para essa hipótese. O que se entende é que nem sempre a Sociologia teve um caráter crítico e transformador, funcionando muitas vezes como um discurso conservador, integrador e até cívico – como aparece nos primeiros manuais da disciplina. Não se pode esquecer que a Sociologia chegou ao Brasil de mãos dadas com o positivismo. No caso recente, deve-se entender que a ausência da disciplina se prende mais a tensões ou escaramuças pedagógico-administrativas que propriamente a algum conteúdo ideológico mais explícito (BRASIL/MEC, 2006). -/- Paralelamente, algumas associações de sociólogos, em diferentes estados brasileiros – mas principalmente em São Paulo –, iniciaram um movimento pela volta da Sociologia ao ensino médio, almejando a ampliação de espaço de trabalho para os formandos dos cursos de Ciências Sociais. Apesar de não haver a obrigatoriedade da disciplina, os cursos de Ciências Sociais continuavam a formar professores de Sociologia. Em alguns estados brasileiros, ao longo dos anos, foram abertos concursos para professores de Sociologia. -/- Com a Constituição de 1988 e a consequente formulação das constituições estaduais, sociólogos em todo o país passaram a reivindicar a presença da Sociologia no ensino médio. Assim, leis estaduais de alguns estados e as constituições estaduais do Rio de Janeiro e de Minas Gerais tornaram a Sociologia obrigatória no ensino médio. -/- A partir do ano 2000, organizações representativas de sociólogos (sindicatos e associações de sociólogos e de cientistas sociais) de várias tendências, assim como pequenos grupos nas universidades do país, começaram a desenvolver um movimento em defesa da obrigatoriedade do ensino da Sociologia no nível médio, considerando que os conteúdos dessa disciplina contribuíam para melhor formação do jovem estudante. -/- O movimento estendeu-se ao início do século XXI, conquistando o apoio de instituições de ensino, associações científicas, intelectuais, sindicatos e associações de categorias profissionais. Finalmente, pela Lei n° 11.684, de 2 de junho de 2008, que alterou a Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional, a Sociologia retornou oficial e obrigatoriamente ao currículo do ensino médio brasileiro. -/- A título de conclusão, e ainda refletindo sobre a Sociologia e sua contribuição para a formação dos estudantes, é importante destacar o que as Orientações Curriculares para o ensino médio afirmam com muita clareza: -/- A presença da Sociologia no currículo do ensino médio tem provocado muita discussão. Além dessa justificativa que se tornou slogan ou clichê – “formar o cidadão crítico” –, entende-se que haja outras mais objetivas decorrentes da concretude com que a Sociologia pode contribuir para a formação do jovem brasileiro, quer aproximando esse jovem de uma linguagem especial que a Sociologia oferece, quer sistematizando os debates em torno de temas de importância dados pela tradição ou pela contemporaneidade. A Sociologia, como espaço de realização das Ciências Sociais na escola média, pode oferecer ao aluno, além de informações próprias do campo dessas ciências, resultados das pesquisas as mais diversas, que acabam modificando as concepções de mundo, a economia, a sociedade e o outro, isto é, o diferente – de outra cultura, “tribo”, país etc. Traz também modos de pensar (...) ou a reconstrução e desconstrução de modos de pensar. É possível, observando as teorias sociológicas, compreender os elementos da argumentação – lógicos e empíricos – que justificam um modo de ser de uma sociedade, classe, grupo social e mesmo com unidade. Isso em termos sincrônicos ou diacrônicos, de hoje ou de ontem. -/- Um papel central que o pensamento sociológico realiza é a desnaturalização das concepções ou explicações dos fenômenos sociais. Há uma tendência sempre recorrente a se explicarem as relações sociais, as instituições, os modos de vida, as ações humanas, coletivas ou individuais, a estrutura social, a organização política etc. com argumentos naturalizadores. Primeiro, perde -se de vista a historicidade desses fenômenos, isto é, que nem sempre foram assim; segundo, que certas mudanças ou continuidades históricas decorrem de decisões, e essas, de interesses, ou seja, de razões objetivas e humanas, não sendo fruto de tendências naturais (BRASIL/MEC, 2006). -/- REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO -/- BRASIL. Secretaria de Educação Básica. Orientações curriculares para o ensino médio: ciências humanas e suas tecnologias. Brasília: Ministério da Educação/Secretaria de Educação Básica, 2006. -/- FILHO, E. D. L. A sociologia no Brasil: história, teorias e desafios. Sociologias , Porto Alegre, n. 14, p. 376-437, dezembro de 2005. -/- MARTINS, C. B.; MICELI, S. (Org.). Sociologia brasileira hoje. São Paulo: ateliê editorial, 2017. -/- SILVA, A. Sociologia em movimento. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Moderna, 2016. -/- -/- SBS - Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia PUCRS - PPG em Ciências Sociais Avenida Ipiranga, 6681 - Partenon CEP: 90619-900 - Porto Alegre, RS [email protected] -/- Estimule a criatividade, respeite o direito autoral. -/- ©2019 - Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of consciousness are based on widely different concepts of its nature, most or all of which probably embody aspects of the truth about it. Starting with a concept of consciousness indicated by the phrase “the feeling of what happens” (the title of a book by Antonio Damásio), we attempt to build a framework capable of supporting and resolving divergent views. We picture consciousness in terms of Reality experiencing itself from the perspective of cognitive agents. Each conscious experience is (...) regarded as composed of momentary feeling events that are combined by recognition and evaluation into extended conscious episodes that bind cognitive contents with a wide range of apparent durations (0.1 secs to 2 or more secs, for us humans, depending on circumstances and context). Three necessary conditions for the existence of consciousness are identified: a) a ground of Reality, envisaged as an universal field of potentiality encompassing all possible manifestations, whether material or 'mental'; b) a transitional zone, leading to; c) a manifest world with its fundamental divisions into material, 'informational' and quale-endowed aspects. We explore ideas about the nature of these necessary conditions, how they may relate to one another and whether our suggestions have empirical implications. (shrink)

In discussions of religious disagreement, some epistemologists have suggested that religious disagreement is distinctive. More specifically, they have argued that religious disagreement has certain features which make it possible for theists to resist conciliatory arguments that they must adjust their religious beliefs in response to finding that peers disagree with them. I consider what I take to be the two most prominent features which are claimed to make religious disagreement distinct: religious evidence and evaluative standards in religious contexts. I argue (...) that these two features fail to distinguish religious disagreement in the ways they have been taken to. However, I show that the view that religious disagreement is not a unique form of disagreement makes religious disagreement less, rather than more, worrisome to the theist who would prefer to rationally remain steadfast in her religious beliefs. (shrink)

Neste artigo analisamos o conceito de eu quantificado a partir na Perspectiva de Segunda Pessoa, segundo a qual a eu-dade, ou pessoalidade, é atualizada em relações contexto-dependentes de total ou parcial transparência cognitiva não redutíveis aos aspectos considerados nas perspectivas de primeira ou de terceira pessoa. O eu quantificado designa o indivíduo que realiza medições sobre si mesmo por meio de tecnologias ubíquas em rede para obter um suposto maior autoconhecimento, instanciando, segundo alguns autores, um ponto de vista de Quarta (...) Pessoa constituído por relações de alteridade (pessoa-máquina-pessoa) emergentes, em especial, em um cenário sociocultural permeado por tecnologias ubíquas e análises de big data. Procuraremos problematizar a tese de que o automonitoramento digital promoveria um aprofundamento do autoconhecimento, defendida pelos postuladores da quantificação do eu. Procuraremos mostrar que a coleta de dados sobre si mesmo por meio de tecnologias ubíquas não favorece necessariamente a constituição/atualização da pessoalidade porque o automonitoramento digital mediado pode interferir significativamente nos modos de interação social da Segunda Pessoa e no autoconhecimento que tal interação pode promover. (shrink)

In this paper I draw together the notion of the absent referent as proposed by Carol J. Adams, and the notions of literal and symbolical sacrifice by eating the other — or ingestion — advanced by Jacques Derrida, to characterize how animals are commonly perceived, which ultimately forbids productive arguments for vegetarianism. I discuss animals as being literally and definitionally absent referents, and I argue, informed by Derrida’s philosophy, that it is impossible to aim at turning them into present referents (...) without reinforcing symbolic ingestion by linking symbolic ingestion to epistemic appropriation or conceptualization. With this, I highlight the ethical importance of discussing symbolic ingestion in animal philosophy. (shrink)

I explore the process of changes in the observability of entities and objects in science and how such changes impact two key issues in the scientific realism debate: the claim that predictively successful elements of past science are retained in current scientific theories, and the inductive defense of a specific version of inference to the best explanation with respect to unobservables. I provide a case-study of the discovery of radium by Marie Curie in order to show that the observability of (...) some entities can change and that such changes are relevant for arguments seeking to establish the reliability of success-to-truth inferences with respect to unobservables. (shrink)

Pretende-se auscultar a possibilidade de instrução moral pela literatura. Defender-se-á que a arte narrativa é capaz de instruir moralmente pois 1) proporciona um tipo de conhecimento não-proposicional que permite o acesso a novas perspetivas, e 2) é capaz de cultivar e refinar os valores e as práticas morais dos leitores, através do engajamento emocional. Tentar-se-á mostrar que o poder inverso — o poder de corromper moralmente — não se verifica (ou não se verifica tão facilmente): apelar-se-á à resistência imaginativa humana (...) que parece impedir que o Homem exporte perspetivas morais que violentam o seu próprio posicionamento axiológico. (shrink)

Este estudio se ocupa del control social del cuerpo y de la reconfiguración de la memoria popular en películas de horror a través de la perspectiva genealógica de Foucault, presentada en su libro Vigilar y Castigar, publicado hace 40 años. Por lo tanto, tomaremos, À l’interieur e Frontière (s), dos producciones de horror cinematográfico hechas por directores franceses, ambos publicados en 2007. La hipótesis principal es que las películas de terror se muestran como una nueva forma de vigilancia y control (...) social del cuerpo. Por otro lado, también puede recodificar la memoria popular apropiándose de acontecimientos polítcos y/o revolucionarios como en las películas comentadas por Foucault en la revista Cahiers de Cinéma en 1974 políticas, aunque no sean las películas de terror. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to refute the metaphysicians ‘methodological continuation’ argument supporting epistemic realism in metaphysics. This argument aims to show that scientific realists have to accept that metaphysics is as rationally justified as science given that they both employ inference to the best explanation, i.e. that metaphysics and science are methodologically continuous. I argue that the reasons given by scientific realists as to why inference to the best explanation is reliable in science do not constitute a (...) reason to believe that it is reliable in metaphysics. The justification of IBE in science and the justification of IBE in metaphysics are two distinct issues with only superficial similarities, and one cannot rely on one for the other. This becomes especially clear when one analyses the debate about the legitimacy of IBE that has taken place between realists and empiricists. The metaphysician seeking to piggyback on the realist defense of IBE in science by the methodological continuation argument presupposes that the defense is straightforwardly applicable to metaphysics. I will argue that it is, in fact, not. The favoured defenses of IBE in scientific realism make extensive use of empirical considerations, predictive power and inductive evidence, all of which are paradigmatically absent in the metaphysical context. Furthermore, I argue that the metaphysician, even if the realist would concede to the methodological continuation argument, fails to offer any agreed upon conclusions resulting from its application in metaphysics. As a result, the scientific realist is not committed to believing that there is metaphysical knowledge. (shrink)

This article argues that pseudoscience lacks an adequate philosophical analysis. Using conspiracy theories as a case study, it is claimed that such an analysis needs to go beyond a mere epistemological approach. In the first part, it is shown that the existing philosophical literature shares the assumption that conspiracy theories are primarily deficient scientific hypotheses. This claim is contested, because such an approach can only understand what conspiracy theories fail to be, but not what they are and why people tend (...) to endorse them. To develop an alternative, the second part starts from recent sociology of science, applied to conspiracy theories, that claims that both true and false theories are in need of a symmetrical social explanation. However, this opens the path to relativism because it does not allow for a significant distinction between scientific and conspiracy theories. In the third section an alternative analysis of conspiracy theories is offered, which does not abandon this distinction. Moreover, it is claimed that the most important element of conspiracy theories is not their truth value but rather their symbolic structures of meaning. The aim of conspiracy theories, and perhaps of pseudoscience in general, is then not to know facts about the world, but rather to offer a meaningful framework within which to live. (shrink)

This article takes the scientific study of conspiracy theories itself as an object of inquiry. It looks at the three main frameworks to look at conspiracy theories: a psychological, epistemological and a sociological approach. These different approaches exist somewhat separately and often do not get along. The central claim that follows from a genealogy of these research programs is that the conflicts between these different approaches should be understood not merely as disagreements about how the world works, but as a (...) fundamental disagreement about the underlying diagnosis of what is at stake in conspiracy theories. In other words, the conflicts stem in part from political differences, not merely empirical ones. The purpose of this article is to bring these different diagnoses back into dialogue with each other and to point out that despite their differences, they also have something in common: a concern about the state of contemporary democratic institutions. Depending on which project one subscribes to, conspiracy thinking will appear either as the cause or the solution of these democratic concerns. (shrink)

I here defend microphysical manyism. According to microphysical manyism, each composite or higher-level object is a mere plurality of microphysical particles. After clarifying the commitments of the view, I offer two physicalist-friendly arguments in its favour. The first argument appeals to the Canberra Plan. Here I argue that microphysical particles acting in unison play the theoretical roles associated with composite objects - that they do everything that we think of composite objects as doing - and thus that composite objects are (...) to be identified with pluralities of microphysical particles. Along the way I rebut the objections that pluralities of particles don’t display the right emergent, ‘lingering’, or modal properties to be good candidates for identification with higher-level objects. In the second argument I claim that microphysical manyism is uniquely able to capture a compelling and widespread physicalist intuition concerning the intimate nature of the relationship between higher-level, composite objects and the microphysical world. (shrink)

Which political principles should govern global politics? In his new book, Simon Caney engages with the work of philosophers, political theorists, and international relations scholars in order to examine some of the most pressing global issues of our time. Are there universal civil, political, and economic human rights? Should there be a system of supra- state institutions? Can humanitarian intervention be justified?

The central claim of this article is that post-truth requires a political and socio-economical perspective, rather than a moral or epistemological one. The article consists of two parts. The first part offers a critical examination of the dominant analyses of post-truth in terms of shifting standards of the origin and the evaluation of facts. Moreover, the claim that postmodernism is the cause of post-truth is examined and refuted. In the second part an alternative perspective is developed, centring around the notion (...) of gatekeepers. Rather than linking post-truth to bullshit and postmodernism, it should be understood as a symptom of a contemporary shift in the gatekeepers of truth and knowledge. Knowledge and truth are always mediated in society through the hands of gatekeeping institutions such as journalism or science. Post-truth is a symptom of a broader transformation of the gatekeeping institutions of our current society. It therefore requires a political philosophy of these institutional shifts and the new risks they involve. (shrink)

The badness of having conflicting emotions is a familiar theme in academic ethics, clinical psychology, and commercial self-help, where emotional harmony is often put forward as an ideal. Many philosophers give emotional harmony pride of place in their theories of practical reason.1 Here we offer a defense of a particular species of emotional conflict, namely, ambivalence. We articulate an conception of ambivalence, on which ambivalence is unresolved inconsistent desire (§1) and present a case of appropriate ambivalence (§2), before considering two (...) alternative defenses of emotional conflict (§3). We then argue that inconsistent desires can be fitting (§4) and that it can be reasonable not to resolve inconsistent desires (§5), before considering an objection (§6) and concluding the discussion (§7). (shrink)

This paper argues for a methodological point that bears on a relatively long-standing debate concerning collective beliefs in the sense elaborated by Margaret Gilbert: are they cases of belief or rather of acceptance? It is argued that epistemological accounts and distinctions developed in individual epistemology on the basis of considering the individual case are not necessarily applicable to the collective case or, more generally, uncritically to be adopted in collective epistemology.

Scientific realism driven by inference to the best explanation (IBE) takes empirically confirmed objects to exist, independent, pace empiricism, of whether those objects are observable or not. This kind of realism, it has been claimed, does not need probabilistic reasoning to justify the claim that these objects exist. But I show that there are scientific contexts in which a non-probabilistic IBE-driven realism leads to a puzzle. Since IBE can be applied in scientific contexts in which empirical confirmation has not yet (...) been reached, realists will in these contexts be committed to the existence of empirically unconfirmed objects. As a consequence of such commitments, because they lack probabilistic features, the possible empirical confirmation of those objects is epistemically redundant with respect to realism. (shrink)

Schizophrenia is usually described as a fragmentation of subjective experience and the impossibility to engage in meaningful cultural and intersubjective practices. Although the term schizophrenia is less than 100 years old, madness is generally believed to have accompanied mankind through its historical and cultural ontogeny. What does it mean to be “mad”? The failure to adopt social practices or to internalize cultural values of common sense? Despite the vast amount of literature and research, it seems that the study of schizophrenia (...) and of the psychoses is suffering from a generic disintegration. In this introduction, we offer an historical overview of the variety of theories and approaches to schizophrenia. We also provide an overview of how the authors in this volume attempt an integrative account where training, practice, theory and research are considered as parts of a larger whole. This is a varied and pluralistic volume, and it is up to the readers to make use of different chapters according to their own needs. (shrink)

This paper is a reply to Richard Lauer’s “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?” (2019) and an attempt to contribute to the meta-social ontological discourse more broadly. In the first part, I will give a rough sketch of Lauer’s general project and confront his pragmatist approach with a fundamental problem. The second part of my reply will provide a solution for this problem rooted in a philosophy of the social sciences in practice.

There are two currently popular but quite different ways of answering the question of what constitutes personal identity: the one is usually called the psychological continuity theory (or Psychological View) and the other the narrative theory.1 Despite their differences, they do both claim to be providing an account—the correct account—of what makes someone the same person over time. Marya Schechtman has presented an important argument in this journal (Schechtman 2005) for a version of the narrative view (the ‘Self-Understanding View’) over (...) the psychological one, an argument which has received an overwhelmingly positive response from commentators (Gillett 2005; Heinemaa 2005; Phillips 2006). I wish to argue that .. (shrink)

This paper raises two problems for plan-expressivism concerning normative judgments about non-corealizable actions: actions which cannot both be performed. First, plan-expressivists associate normative judgment with an attitude which satisfies a corealizability constraint, but this constraint is (in the interpersonal case) unwarranted, and (in the intrapersonal case) warranted only at the price of a contentious normative premise. Ayars (2022) holds that the pair of judgments ‘A should φ’ and ‘B should ψ’ is coherent only if one believes that A can φ (...) while B ψ’s. But this is false. Both Gibbard (2003) and Ayars hold that the pair of judgments ‘A should φ’ and ‘A should ψ’ is coherent only if one believes that A can φ and ψ. But this assumes possibilism. Second, the paper demonstrates, cases involving interpersonal non-corealizability prompt judgments about what multiple agents should do which – contra Gibbard – are not plausibly associated with any planning subject. (shrink)

Typical agreements can be seen as joint decisions, inherently involving obligations of a distinctive kind. These obligations derive from the joint commitment' that underlies a joint decision. One consequence of this understanding of agreements and their obligations is that coerced agreements are possible and impose obligations. It is not that the parties to an agreement should always conform to it, all things considered. Unless one is released from the agreement, however, one has some reason to conform to it, whatever else (...) is true. In this sense, one is under an obligation to the other parties. The relevance of these points to the issue of political obligation is discussed. (shrink)

We provide a novel defense of the possibility of level-splitting beliefs and use this defense to show that the steadfast response to peer disagreement is not, as it is often claimed to be, unnecessarily dogmatic. To provide this defense, a neglected form of moral disagreement is analysed. Within the context of this particular kind of moral disagreement, a similarly neglected form of level-splitting belief is identified and then defended from critics of the rationality of level-splitting beliefs. The chapter concludes by (...) showing that proponents of the steadfast response to peer disagreement can adopt this form of level-splitting belief in the context of these moral disagreements while exemplifying intellectual humility, rather than dogmatism. (shrink)

Imagine that you are a farmer living in Kenya. Though you work hard to sell your produce to foreign markets you find yourself unable to do so because affluent countries subsidize their own farmers and erect barriers to trade, like tariffs, thereby undercutting you in the marketplace. As a consequence of their actions you languish in poverty despite your very best efforts. Or, imagine that you are a peasant whose livelihood depends on working in the fields in Indonesia and you (...) are forcibly displaced from your land by a biofuels company because corrupt government officials have stolen the land and sold it to the company. Or, suppose that you work on the coast of Bangladesh but find that increasingly you are unable to cope with salination resulting from sealevel rise – a product of anthropogenic climate change. These, I believe, are cases of global injustice. My question is: What are those who bear the brunt of global injustice entitled to do to secure their, and other people’s, entitlements? Often people focus on the duties of the affluent to respect and uphold the rights of the disadvantaged. This is understandable. But there is a striking omission. Rarely do people analyze, or even mention, what those who lack their entitlements are entitled to do to secure their own rights. This is my focus in this paper. More specifically, I examine what agents are entitled to do to change the underlying social, economic and political practices and structures in a more just direction. (shrink)

É bem conhecida a divergência entre as posições de Gottlob Frege e Bertrand Russell com relação ao tratamento semântico dado a sentenças contendo termos singulares indefinidos, ou seja, termos singulares sem referência ou com referência ambígua, tais como ‘Papai Noel’ ou ‘o atual rei da França’ ou ‘1/0 ’ ou ‘√4’ ou ‘o autor de Principia Mathematica’. Para Frege, as sentenças da linguagem natural que contêm termos indefinidos não formam declarações e portanto não são nem verdadeiras nem falsas. Já para (...) as sentenças da matemática, Frege defende que elas precisam ser corrigidas através da convenção forçada de uma referência não ambígua. Russell, por outro lado, aceita os termos indefinidos e propõe, através de sua teoria das descrições definidas, uma maneira de avaliar as sentenças em que eles ocorrem; e Quine amplia a teoria de Russell para abranger também os nomes com problemas de referência. Na prática da matemática são comuns os termos singulares indefinidos, sem referência, tais como ‘1/0 ’, ou com referência ambígua, tais como ‘√4’. Apesar de não haver uma sistematização rigorosa desta situação entre os matemáticos, há, no entanto, um conjunto de regras convencionais que tradicionalmente costumam ser aplicadas no tratamento matemático dos termos indefinidos. Nossa proposta é tomar a convenção matemática como inspiração e modelo para apresentar uma interpretação semântica formal para as descrições definidas e os nomes e utilizá-la como um argumento que favorece a abordagem de Russell relativamente à de Frege. (shrink)

My interest in this chapter is to investigate this crossroad as applied to mental properties, considered powers. In particular, I scrutinize the possibility of taking the phenomenal property of feeling pain as a complex power or disposition. This possibility comes in handy in discussing panpsychism, the view that the ultimate elements of reality are phenomenal properties, which would ground physical properties as well.

Much of the ontology made in the analytic tradition of philosophy nowadays is founded on some of Quine’s proposals. His naturalism and the binding between existence and quantification are respectively two of his very influential metaphilosophical and methodological theses. Nevertheless, many of his specific claims are quite controversial and contemporaneously have few followers. Some of them are: (a) his rejection of higher-order logic; (b) his resistance in accepting the intensionality of ontological commitments; (c) his rejection of first-order modal logic; and (...) (d) his rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. I intend to argue that these controversial negative claims are just interconnected consequences of those much more accepted and apparently less harmful metaphilosophical and methodological theses, and that the glue linking all these consequences to its causes is the notion of extensionality. (shrink)

Este artigo propõe a adoção do método da análise de conceitos conforme apresentada por John Wilson, como metodologia pedagógica e principal conteúdo para a disciplina de filosofia no ensino médio.

MARGARET LYNN SCHABAS (Toronto, 1954) is professor of philosophy at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver and served as the head of the Philosophy Department from 2004-2009. She has held professoriate positions at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and at York University, and has also taught as a visiting professor at Michigan State University, University of Colorado-Boulder, Harvard, CalTech, the Sorbonne, and the École Normale de Cachan. As the recipient of several fellowships, she has enjoyed visiting terms at Stanford, Duke, (...) MIT, Cambridge, the LSE, and the MPI-Berlin. In addition to her doctorate in the history and philosophy of science and technology (Toronto 1983), she holds a bachelor of science in music (oboe) and the philosophy of science (Indiana 1976), a master’s degree in the history and philosophy of science (Indiana 1977), and a master’s degree in economics (Michigan1985). -/- She has published four books and over forty articles or book chapters in science studies. Some of the journals in which her articles can be found are Isis, Monist, History of Political Economy, Public Affairs Quarterly, Daedaelus, Journal of Economic Perspectives, and Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Her first book, A world ruled by number (1990) examines the emergence of mathematical economics in the second half of the nineteenth century. Her second book, The natural origins of economics (2005), traces the transformation of economics from a natural to a social science. She also has two co-edited collections, Oeconomies in the age of Newton (2003), with Neil De Marchi, and David Hume’s political economy (2008), with Carl Wennerlind. She is currently writing a monograph on Hume’s economics, as well as articles on the history and philosophy of bioeconomics. She is currently president of the History of Economics Society. -/- EJPE interviewed Margaret Schabas at the University of British Columbia in March 2013. In this interview, she recounts her earliest foray into the history and philosophy of economics, the conceptual trade between economics and natural science, and her most recent undertaking: the history and philosophy of bioeconomics. (shrink)

Among other things, this paper considers what so-called collective guilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimes appropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed be guilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collective to intend to do something and to act in light of that intention. An account of collective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting. Finally, a "plural subject" account of collective guilt feelings is (...) articulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt as a body. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to support the logical incompatibility of the opposing views as a criterion for characterizing disagreements as genuinely metaphysical. That is, I intend to argue that a specific dispute is a metaphysical disagreement only when the conflicting views are governed by different logics. If correct, this criterion would not only help to separate merely verbal from genuine metaphysical debates, but it also would ground an argument against deflationism, guaranteeing the substantiality and relevance of metaphysics. I (...) intend to clarify the criterion, to present its basic foundations and commitments, to give some logical and metaphysical motivations for its adoption and some examples of its application. (shrink)

Réplica a Angioni, “Relações causais entre eventos na ciência aristotélica: uma discussão crítica de Ciência e Dialética em Aristóteles, de Oswaldo Porchat”.

The author argues that Plato’s “proof” that happiness follows justice has a fatal flaw – because the philosopher king in Plato’s Republic is itself a counter example.

Parece um fato bastante trivial que quando uma teoria científica se torna obsoleta, por ter sido substituída por outra, isto não tem nenhuma consequência para os objetos técnicos compatíveis com a teoria antiga. Pretendo, neste ensaio, responder à questão bem menos óbvia de por que isto se dá. Como subproduto, apresento uma defesa da teoria da ciência de Thomas Kuhn. Para tanto, inicio mostrando como a teoria de Kuhn foi motivada por considerações sobre a história da ciência. Em seguida, defendo (...) um pressuposto sobre como se dá a relação entre ciência e tecnologia. Continuo, apresentando uma distinção entre conteúdo factual e conceitual na ciência. E. (shrink)

Artigo de divulgação científica que reflete sobre a relação entre o conhecimento científico e as teses deterministas e fatalistas.

Despite well-established results in survey methodology, many experimental philosophers have not asked whether and in what way conclusions about folk intuitions follow from people’s responses to their surveys. Rather, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that intuitions can be simply read off from survey responses. Survey research, however, is fraught with difficulties. I review some of the relevant literature—particularly focusing on the conversational pragmatic aspects of survey research—and consider its application to common experimental philosophy surveys. I argue for (...) two claims. First, that experimental philosophers’ survey methodology leaves the facts about folk intuitions massively underdetermined; and second, that what has been regarded as evidence for the instability of philosophical intuitions is, at least in some cases, better accounted for in terms of subjects’ reactions to subtle pragmatic cues contained in the surveys. (shrink)

Social scientists have paid insufficient attention to the role of law in constituting the economic institutions of capitalism. Part of this neglect emanates from inadequate conceptions of the nature of law itself. Spontaneous conceptions of law and property rights that downplay the role of the state are criticized here, because they typically assume relatively small numbers of agents and underplay the complexity and uncertainty in developed capitalist systems. In developed capitalist economies, law is sustained through interaction between private agents, courts (...) and the legislative apparatus. Law is also a key institution for overcoming contracting uncertainties. It is furthermore a part of the power structure of society, and a major means by which power is exercised. This argument is illustrated by considering institutions such as property and the firm. Complex systems of law have played a crucial role in capitalist development and are also vital for developing economies. (shrink)

Der Artikel diskutiert Niklas Luhmanns Konzeption von Kommunikation als emergentem Phänomen. Erstens soll gezeigt werden, dass sich Luhmann, entgegen jüngster Einwände, in der Tat als sozialer Emergentist rekonstruieren und als solcher in die aktuelle Debatte um Reduktion und Emergenz des Sozialen einordnen lässt. Zweitens soll dadurch Licht auf die generellen Probleme und Voraussetzungen einer emergentistischen Soziologie geworfen werden. Um diese Ziele zu erreichen, wird zunächst geklärt, welche Positionen sich in der Soziologie grundsätzlich gegenüber stehen und auf welcher Grundlage Luhmann als (...) Emergentist einzuordnen ist. Anschließend soll die Emergenz der Kommunikation als eigenständiges soziales Phänomen erläutert und ins Verhältnis zum Individuum gesetzt werden. Schließlich wird Luhmanns Konzeption mit Hilfe einiger Adäquatheitsbedingungen aus der allgemeinen Wissenschaftsphilosophie als unzureichend kritisiert. Ziel ist dabei auch die Klärung der Bedingungen für eine plausible Emergenztheorie innerhalb der Soziologie. Nach einer abschließenden Zusammenfassung der wesentlichen Ergebnisse soll ein Ausblick auf eine aussichtsreiche soziologische Emergenzkonzeption geboten werden. (shrink)

A distorted representation of one's own body is a diagnostic criterion and core psychopathology of both anorexia nervosa (AN) and bulimia nervosa (BN). Despite recent technical advances in research, it is still unknown whether this body image disturbance is characterized by body dissatisfaction and a low ideal weight and/or includes a distorted perception or processing of body size. In this article, we provide an update and meta-analysis of 42 articles summarizing measures and results for body size estimation (BSE) from 926 (...) individuals with AN, 536 individuals with BN and 1920 controls. We replicate findings that individuals with AN and BN overestimate their body size as compared to controls (ES= 0.63). Our meta-regression shows that metric methods (BSE by direct or indirect spatial measures) yield larger effect sizes than depictive methods (BSE by evaluating distorted pictures), and that effect sizes are larger for patients with BN than for patients with AN. To interpret these results, we suggest a revised theoretical framework for BSE that accounts for differences between depictive and metric BSE methods regarding the underlying body representations (conceptual vs. perceptual, implicit vs. explicit). We also discuss clinical implications and argue for the importance of multimethod approaches to investigate body image disturbance. (shrink)

Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination problem and the prisoner’s (...) dilemma—are then considered. An explanation is given of how, when such a problem is interpreted in terms of the parties’ inclinations, a suitable collective intention resolves the problem for agents who are rational in a broad sense other than the technical sense of game theory. Key Words: rationality • collective action • collective intention • joint commitment. (shrink)

Poetry is the most complex and intricate of human language used across all languages and cultures. Its relation to the worlds of human experience has perplexed writers and readers for centuries, as has the question of evaluation and judgment: what makes a poem "work" and endure. The Poem as Icon focuses on the art of poetry to explore its nature and function: not interpretation but experience; not what poetry means but what it does. Using both historic and contemporary approaches of (...) embodied cognition from various disciplines, Margaret Freeman argues that a poem's success lies in its ability to become an icon of the felt "being" of reality. Freeman explains how the features of semblance, metaphor, schema, and affect work to make a poem an icon, with detailed examples from various poets. By analyzing the ways poetry provides insights into the workings of human cognition, Freeman claims that taste, beauty, and pleasure in the arts are simply products of the aesthetic faculty, and not the aesthetic faculty itself. The aesthetic faculty, she argues, should be understood as the science of human perception, and therefore constitutive of the cognitive processes of attention, imagination, memory, discrimination, expertise, and judgment. (shrink)

Analyzing the position of two philosophers whose views are recognizably divergent, W. O. Quine and M. Dummett, we intend to support a striking point of agreement between them: the idea that our logical principles constitute our principles about what there is, and therefore, that logic is metaphysics.

‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another, have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some form of psychological continuity theory of identity, arguments from Marya Schechtman and Kathleen Wilkes have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support is due to a lack of detail in their description or a reliance on predictions that we are in no position to (...) make. I argue that the case against them rests on two serious misunderstandings of the operation of thought-experiments, and that even if they do not ultimately support a psychological continuity theory, they do major damage to that theory’s opponents. (shrink)

Governments are often so focused on short-term gains that they ignore the long term, thus creating extra unnecessary burdens on their citizens, and violating their responsibilities to future generations. What can be done about this? In this paper I propose a package of reforms to the ways in which policies are made by legislatures, and in which those policies are scrutinised, implemented and evaluated. The overarching aim is to enhance the accountability of the decision-making process in ways that take into (...) account the interests of persons in the future. (shrink)

Many agents have failed to comply with their responsibilities to take the action needed to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change. This pervasive noncompliance raises two questions of nonideal political theory. First, it raises the question of what agents should do when others do not discharge their climate responsibilities. (the Responsibility Question) In this paper I put forward four principles that we need to employ to answer the Responsibility Question (Sections II-V). I then illustrate my account, by outlining four kinds of (...) action that should be undertaken (Section VI). Pervasive noncompliance also raises a second question: Given the lack of progress in combating climate change, should existing governance structures be maintained or changed (and if they should be changed, in what ways)? (the Governance Question). The paper briefly outlines a methodology for addressing this question and outlines what a nonideal response to the existing institutional structures would be (Section VII). It does so with reference to the Paris Agreement, and in particular the creation of a "global stocktake" (Article 14, Paris Agreement) and the "facilitative dialogue" (paragraph 20 of the ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’). The aim, then, is to set out an account of a nonideal theory of climate justice. (shrink)